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ONE POTATO [E], Two POTATO [E], THREE POTATO[El,
FouR POWER, POWER, WE WANT MORE: A
THOUGHT ON "OvERIWYERING"
BURTON BRODY*
INTRODUCTION
It was one of those rare collegial conversations from which one gains
an insight rather than merely engages in Dean-bashing (nitpicking?, whin-
ing?). You are free to characterize casual faculty conversation as your ex-
perience dictates. He said:
You know-it was, after all, an informal conversation-the mis-
take most people make in thinking about criminal law is that they
see it as a grant of power to the State. Just the opposite is true;
criminal law is a limitation of sovereign power. Before there was
criminal law, the King could kill you for any reason or for no
reason other than he wanted you gonel! After criminal law came
into existence, the King could only kill you if he had an accepta-
ble reason, i.e., you had committed a crime.'
That observation certainly made me look at criminal law in a new way.
Sometime later, in a telephone conversation with my brother about
an article of his dealing with "unfair discharge"2 , it dawned on me that
employers too-although much more recentlyl-had also had their power
to "terminate"3 severely restricted. Putting these two thoughts together-
no mean feat for an aging contracts teacherl-I began to see much of
American law in a new way.
* Burton Brody, Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
1. The colleague with whom I had this discussion recalls it and will verify it if someone
accuses me of imagining it for the purposes of this paper.
2. Arthur Brody, Wrongful Termination As Labor Law, 17 Sw. U. L. REv. 434 (1988). My
brother remembers his article and although he sees the employment relationship in terms of
power (see 435-437), he does not necessarily agree that "lawyering" is the solution; although
all the solutions he discusses involve legal action. Therefore he asks that I point out that he is
not responsible for the views herein expressed because, as one might well guess, he is not his
brother's keeper.
Who then, one might well ask, is responsible for the care and feeding of so brutish a
mythologic beast as a Contracts teacher?
Certainly not my wife. She is too beautiful and refined a woman-I describe her thus
because it is accurate and because, as she often reminds me, I have to sleep sometime!-for
such demeaning labor.
The only other possible candidate for such discreditable work is my Dean. Any inspec-
tion quickly discloses that he has decently discharged his disgraceful duties; I am obviously
well fed, but my cage could use a cleaningll
3. At this point I will not ask you to pardon the pun. However, I reserve the right to do
so should the Muse continue to strike me in this fashion. For the moment, you must take
comfort in the fact that it is rare for law review writing to be completed in one sitting. So
your chances are good she will strike me differently in future sessions.
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PREMISE
Limiting the arbitrary exercise of power characterizes the develop-
ment of American law in the twentieth century. Limiting power and, more
importantly to the conduct and quality of private affairs, limiting the abil-
ity of the powerful to wield power arbitrarily, may be the distinguishing
feature our law. In a nation that has limitation of government power im-
bedded in its founding document, limitations of and on the exercise of
private power became inevitable.
If the epigram, "Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts abso-
lutely," is an accurate description of the effect of power on those who
wield it, one might equally describe the reaction of Americans subjected to
it as, "Power annoys and despotic power revolts ultimately." The distrust
of autocratic rule that gave rise to the American experiment in democracy
echoes in a national antipathy toward authority. This antiauthoritarianism
takes form in laws that limit the acquisition, accumulation, and most fre-
quently, the exercise of power.
Legal curbs on power have been created in a number of different
ways. One method was to legislatively create limits on the acquisition and
exercise of power, giving courts additional cases and issues to adjudicate.
A second method was to enact a new set of rights that countervailed an
existing concentration of power and also create a special bureaucracy to
administer the conflicts between the new rights and the challenged power.
Another uniquely American means of legally restricting the exercise of
power was to judicially create new criteria for the exercise of existing
power and thus create new issues that had to be litigated.
Regardless of the manner of its creation, the essence of a limitation
on power, or its exercise, is that it creates issues that must be adjudicated
by a bureaucracy and, in some instances, requires a new bureaucracy to
administer and adjudicate the limits. The individuals in this society
trained to deal with bureaucracy are lawyers. And further, the individuals
in this society capable of administering a bureaucracy (rule-making, inves-
tigating and adjudicating) are lawyers. Thus the nexus between lawyering
and eliminating abusive power and its exercise is apparent.
LAWS THAT LIMIT POWER
The classic example of laws that limit the acquisition and abuse of
power are the antitrust laws.4 Concerned that too much economic and
market power was being concentrated in the hands of too few,5 Congress
4. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-
27 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993); Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1988).
5. See Robert H. Bork, The Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L &
EcoN. 7, 7-48 (1966); WrujAm LErwN, LAw AND EcoONmic Poucy rN AaFmucA 88-99 (1965);
HANs B. THORELu, THE FEDERAL ANrUsr Poucy (1955). For congressional debate sur-
rounding the Sherman Act see S. Res. 1, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. (1889) reprinted in 1 The legisla-
tive History of the Federal Antitrust Laws and Related Statutes § 89 (Earl W. Kintner ed.
1978); see also 21 CONG. REc. 2460, 2457, 3146, 3152 (1890).
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enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act.6 There has been much debate
whether the primary goal of the antitrust laws was to protect competition
(i.e., limit the powerful) or promote efficiency.7 Regardless of the debate,
seemingly unresolved and unresolvable, it is fair to conclude that at least a
part of the motivation behind the antitrust laws was a distrust of power.
Judge Learned Hand, in United States v. Aluminum Corporation of America
said:
We have been speaking only of the economic reasons which for-
bid monopoly; but, as we have already implied, there are others,
based on the belief that great industrial consolidations are inher-
ently undesirable, regardless of their economic results. In the de-
bates in Congress Senator Sherman . . . himself showed that
among the purposes of Congress in 1890 was a desire to put an
end to great aggregations of capital because of the helplessness of
the individual before them.
8
The distrust of power and its abuse are clearer in.the antitrust laws
that followed the Sherman Act. Section 3 of the Clayton Act9 prohibits
"tie in" sales (i.e., a seller tying one product to another, or expressly
prohibiting purchasing a competitor's product, or requiring the pur-
chaser to purchase only from a certain supplier). Prohibiting tying sales
explicitly inhibits a seller with substantial market power from using that
power to affect another market.' 0 Section 7, the antimerger section of the
Clayton Act," expresses obvious concern about excessive power by mak-
ing illegal those mergers that substantially lessen competition. And Sec-
tions 2 (a) and (f) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman
Act,12 clearly aim at abusive use of market power by making it unlawful for
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
7. E. TkomAs SuLuvAN & JEFFaY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 2-6 (1988); ROBERT H. BORy, THE ANTITRUST PARADox: A Poucy AT
WAR wrri ITSELF 51 (1978). Professor Bork's views, although concerned with other issues,
support the position that Congress sought to limit the accumulation and exercise of power
when it enacted the antitrust laws:
(1) The only legitimate goal of American antitrust law is the maximization of con-
sumer welfare; therefore,
(2) "Competition," for the purposes of antitrust analysis, must be understood as a
term of art signifying any state of affairs in which consumer welfare cannot be in-
creased by judicial decree.
Id. at 51. Bork refines his definition of competition:
"Competition" may be read as a shorthand expression, a term of art, designating
any state of affairs in which consumer welfare cannot be increased by moving to an
alternative state of affairs through judicial decree. Conversely, "monopoly" and "
restraint of trade" would be terms of art for situations in which consumer welfare
could be so improved, and to "monopolize" or engage in "unfair competition"
would be to use practices inimical to consumer welfare.
Id. at 61 (emphasis added). Thus, Bork seems to say that the purpose of the antitrust laws is
to protect consumers from "monopoly" and "unfair competition," i.e., excessive accumula-
tions of power and the abuse of it.
8. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d. Cir. 1945) (em-
phasis added).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 14.
10. See LAWRENCE A. SULIUVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE AW OF ANTITRUST 434-40 (1977).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
12. Id. §§ 13a, 13f.
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sellers to discriminate in price between buyers, and for buyers to induce or
receive a discriminatory price.
Additionally, in 1914 the Federal Trade Commission Act was en-
acted.' 3 It outlawed unfair inethods of competition in commerce 14 and
created the Commission' 5 to help the Justice Department enforce the an-
titrust laws. Together these offices, and their efforts in pursuing congres-
sional mandates to control the acquisition and exercise of economic and
market power, have created the need for many lawyers. In 1980, the Anti-
trust Division of Justice alone recorded more than 4,644 attorney days
spent in court.16 When one contemplates the amount of lawyering that
lies behind a day in court, it becomes obvious that the distrust of power
reflected in the antitrust laws created and sustained the need for much
lawyering in government and out.
The laws granting employees the right to organize and bargain collec-
tively as to wages, hours and working conditions are an example of law
that limits the exercise of power rather than prevents its acquisition. The
legislative concern with the disproportionate power of employers, and
their use of it, can be seen in the preamble to the Norris-LaGuardia Act
which stated that employees should be "free from the interference, re-
straint, or coercion of employers .... 17
Congress attacked management's predominance by seeking to equal-
ize power between workers and management. It did so by enacting the
National Labor Relations Act (The Wagner Act) that granted workers the
right to organize and bargain collectively. 18 It sought to further limit
management's excessive power by restricting its exercise; it required man-
agement to bargain in good faith with labor 19 and to refrain from certain
abuses of power called "unfair labor practices." 20 The Supreme Court, in
upholding the constitutionality of the Wagner Act, also recognized that
employers had too often exercised their power autocratically when it
observed:
Refusal to confer and negotiate has been one of the most prolific
causes of strife. This is such an outstanding fact in the history of
labor disturbances that it is a proper subject of judicial notice
21
The Wagner Act also created the National Labor Relations Board to
administer and enforce labor's new rights and the limitations imposed on
13. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-
51 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993)).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
15. Id. § 41.
16. 1980 A'rr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 112.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (emphasis added).
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988). For confirmation that Senator Wagner saw the act in
terms of power, and beyond, see Leon H. Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its Origin And Current
Signiwance, 29 GEo. WASH. L. REa. 199, 215-24 (1960). Mr. Keyserling served as the Senator's
Legislative Assistant at the time the Act was in Congress. Id. at 199.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
20. Id. § 158(a).
21. N.L.R.B. v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42 (1937) (emphasis added).
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the exercise of management's power.2 2 The Board became an active par-
ticipant in American industrial and legal life. In 1936 it filed 1,068 cases,
including 865 unfair labor practice cases; it closed 738, including 636 un-
fair labor cases.23 By 1967, the annual case totals were 30,425 opened
29,494 closed with the unfair labor practice case totals being 17,040
opened and 16,360 closed.24 The 1985 totals were 41,175 opened, 43,328
closed; 32,685 unfair labor practice cases opened and 33,946 closed.25
The opening, investigating, litigating, deciding, appealing and implement-
ing so many cases per year for fifty years no doubt required the skills and
services of many lawyers at the Board and a corresponding number in pri-
vate practice.
American law's response to abusive use of power is also seen within
labor law. After World War II, when it was perceived that unions were
misusing the power they had developed under the protection of the Wag-
ner Act, Congress enacted the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-
Hartley) that outlawed union activity that obstructed commerce, i.e., juris-
dictional strikes and secondary boycotts. 26 Taft-Hartley also gave employ-
ees the right to refrain from union activities and prohibited union
discipline of employees exercising such a right.2 7 The act further limited
union power by requiring' mediation in certain situations,2 8 by providing
for suits to enforce collective bargaining agreements, 29 by placing restric-
tions on payments to employee representatives and on union health and
welfare funds,3 0 and by restricting union political contributions.3 ' Contin-
ued and further abuse of power by union officials led to the Labor-Man-
agement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act).
3 2
Landrum-Griffin limited the power of unions and union officials by,
among other things, creating a members' "bill of rights," 33 requiring peri-
odic financial reports from unions and union officers,34 regulating union
elections,35 and regulating the use and loan of union funds.
3 6
Thus the creation, protection, and regulation of union activity can be
seen as the legal system first seeking to temper the power of employers by
fostering the right of employees to act collectively, and then seeking to
temper untoward union power. And later, when for various reasons,
strong unions could not or would not prevent abusive employer practices,
22. 29 U.S.C. § 153.
23. 1 NLRB ANN. REP. 29, 33 (1936).
24. 32 NLRB ANN. Rm'. 1 (1967).
25. 50 NLRB ANN. REP. 1 (1985).
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1988 & Supp. HI 1992).
27. Id. §§ 157-158(b) (1).
28. Id. § 158(d)(3), 158(d)(4)(C).
29. I& § 159(c) (1) (A) (i).
30. Id. § 186(a).
31. Id&
32. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73
Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1988).
34. Id. § 432.
35. Id. § 481.
36. Id. § 503.
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additional legislative action became necessary. So statutory limits on
abuse of the power to hire were established by Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 196437 to prevent discrimination against individuals based on race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.3 8 Title VII also created the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission,39 creating more lawyer positions
in government, and no doubt, increasing at least the workload in the pri-
vate Bar. Additionally, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act4° and
the Americans With Disabilities Act 4' create additional issues requiring
the attention of lawyers.
However, the disparity in power continued to exist for the nonunion
worker 42 and the majority of the work force did not belong to unions. 43
The evolution of the "termination at will" rule into a body of "unfair dis-
charge" law, viewed from an American antiauthoritarian perspective, illus-
trates the law acting to eliminate autocratic workplace behavior directed at
nonunion workers." Unfair discharge law demonstrates, once again, that
American law consistently seeks to limit the arbitrary exercise of power. As
one observer put it: "The development of rights of action for wrongfully
discharged at will employees reflects the general trend toward increasing the
accountability of those who possess power over the lives of others."4 5 One can also
view current cases dealing with sexual harassment as the legal system's
attempt to deal with a particularly vile abuse of management's workplace
power.
46
Another private relationship that has drawn the attention of the law
because of abusive use of power by the more powerful party is the land-
lord-tenant relationship. Statutes granting lessee's greater rights and lim-
iting lessor's power were enacted,47 and warranties of habitability granting
tenants the right to withhold rent in certain circumstances were created.
48
37. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L No. 88-352,78 Stat. 257 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1988 & Supp. II 1992)).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
39. Id. § 2000e-4.
40. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988 & Supp. 1I 1992).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-114 (Supp. III 1992).
42. For what I would describe as well written, realistic appraisal, see Brody, supra note 2,
at 435-37.
43. Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissak Time for a Statute, 62
VA. L. REv. 481, 483 (1976).
44. See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. Rgv. 1404, 1408 (1967); Clyde W. Summers,
The Rights of Individual Workers, 52 FoRDmu L. REVrEw 1082, 1100-03 (1984).
45. Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Damages for Wrongful Discharge of At Will Employees, 26 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 449, 495-96 (1985) (emphasis added).
46. See e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Turley v. Union Carbide Corp., 618 F.
Supp. 1438 (S.D. W. Va. 1985); see also Bailey v. Unocal Corp., 700 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (applying state law).
47. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 90.100-90.940 (1991); see also C.. Cxvim CODE §§ 1940-1954.1
(West 1985 & Supp. 1993); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 38-12-101 to 38-12-302 (1982 & Supp. 1992);
ILL. ANN. STAT. 765 ILCS 705/1 (Smith-Hurd 1993); N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW §§ 220-238
(McKinney 1989).
48. See, e.g.,Javins v. First Nat. Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970) (court recognized landlord's obligation to keep leased premises in habit-
able condition); see also 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY §§ 5.2, 5.4 (1977) (where
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Courts of various states limited the ability of landlords to use their supe-
rior power to extract from renters exculpatory clauses that freed the land-
lord from liability for negligence.4 9 And federal5 ° and state5 1 fair housing
laws seek to prevent lessors from abusing their power through objectiona-
ble discrimination. All these attempts to limit the exercise of lessor power
increased the need for legal services.
An abuse of a public power, the policing power, drew the attention of
the United States Supreme Court and appears to have stimulated the need
for a good deal of lawyering. Miranda v. Arizona,5 2 the famous case that
requires police interrogators to advise suspects of their rights prior to cus-
todial interrogation, is based on a longstanding concern that over-zealous
police practice can transform inquiry into inquisition. The advice, cou-
pled with the right to have an attorney present during such interrogations,
is a check on the exercise of the physical and psychological power police
officers wield over those in custody.
Some indication of the lawyering created by Miranda can be gathered
by looking at a recent study by Inbau and Manak.5 3 They surveyed Mi-
randa issue decisions by the Supreme Court, the federal circuit courts of
appeal and the intermediate appellate courts of California decided from
1966 (the year of the decision) through 1986. The study reveals that Mi-
randa caused considerable litigation and thus, demanded more lawyering
and lawyers. The Supreme Court considered forty-four such cases, 5 4 the
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals considered Miranda issues in nine
hundred eighty cases (covering 2,155 pages and approximately 1,200,000
wordsl) 55 and the California appellate courts, three hundred sixty three.
56
Alone, these cases represent a lot of lawyering, but when one ponders that
this is only a sample and the other forty nine states would, in all likeli-
hood, also have had a good deal of activity, and then add to that the work
required at the federal and state trial levels to cause the appellate deci-
sions, one begins to see that Miranda created the need for a swarm of
legally trained people.
Other situations in which the law has addressed a particular misuse of
power are almost too numerous to mention. However, I shall mention a
few for the purposes of illustration, confident that the reader can think of
others.
withholding rent is available remedy for tenant when landlord fails to maintain premises for
suitable use).
49. SewTenants Council v. DeFranceaux, 305 F. Supp. 560 (D.C. 1969); McCutcheon v.
United Homes Corp. 486 P.2d 1093 (Wash. 1971).
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1988 & Supp. 111 1992).
51. See CAl.. GowvmiNrr CODE § 12940 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993); CoLo. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 24-34-502 (1988 & Supp. 1993); FLA., STAT. A.NN. §§ 760.20-760.37 (West 1986); ILI
ANN. STAT. 775 ILCS 5/1-101 (Smith-Hurd 1993); N.Y. CiviL LAw §§ 18-a to 19-b (McKinney
1992).
52. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
53. Fred E. Inbau &James P. Manak, Miranda v. Arizona-Is it Worth the Cost?, 24 CAI. W.
L. R-v. 185, 186 (1988).
54. I. at 188.
55. Id. at 189.
56. Id.
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In my own field, the expansion of the doctrine of unconscionability57
and the duty of good faith in the performance and enforcement of con-
tracts58 seem to aim at preventing abusive use of superior economic or
bargaining power. The doctrine of contracts of adhesion5 9 seems similarly
motivated. Economic duress cases also seek to prevent abuse of bargain-
ing power.60 Even the old pre-existing duty rule cases dealt with mis-
dealing by contracting parties who, under the circumstances, held the
upper hand.6 1 Similarly, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code62 and the
Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act63 would appear to be directed at
abuse of market and economic power by lenders and sellers.
There are two other legal limitations on the exercise of power that
deserve mention but are beyond my ability to discuss in any depth. I set
them forth because they may be indicative of other limitations and will
cause the reader to think of more. The "informed consent" principle in
the rendering of medical services tempers the arbitrary exercise of the
superior power that flows from superior knowledge. And lastly, I simply
ask whether one of the motivations behind the liberalizing of pleading
rules and the rules of evidence was the desire to lessen the litigation power
of those who could afford more expensive counsel?
CONCLUSION
For those who believe that limiting power is an essential characteristic
of American law, it is worth noting that the very first dissent 64 ever filed by
Justice Holmes was in a case where the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court held unconstitutional a statute limiting the power of employers to
fine employees. 65 It is further worth noting that Holmes served nine years
on the Court before he felt constrained to dissent.66 Of greatest signifi-
57. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRaCTs § 206 (1981).
58. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978); RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTs § 205 (1981); see also
Sylvan Crest Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 150 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1945) (court requires
good faith when giving notice of contract cancellation).
59. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
60. Laemmar v.J. Walter Thompson Co., 435 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1970); Mitchell v. C.C.
Sanitation Co., 430 S. W.2d 933 (Tex. Ct. App. 1968).
61. 1A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 171 (1963); Burton F. Brody, Per-
formance of a Pre-Existing Duty As Consideration: The Actual Criteuia for the Effiacy of an Agreement
Altering Contractual Obligation, 52 DEN. U. L. REv. -433, 450-56 (1975).
62. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, reprinted in SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES 1200
(1993). "Another basic issue in the regulation of consumer credit is adequate protection of
consumers from creditor practices and agreements that are abusive or have the potential for
abuse." Id. at 1210.
63. UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRAcacFs Act, r7einted in SELECrED COMMERCIAL STAT-
UTEs 1348 (1993). The following quote is from Section 1 of the Act: "Purposes, Rules of
Construction... (2) [T]o protect consumers from suppliers who commit deceptive and un-
conscionable sales practices . . . ." Id.
64. SHELDON M. NovicK, THE HONOR.ABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL
Hot ms 197 (1990).
65. Commonwealth v. Perry, 28 N.E. 1126, 1127 (1891).
66. Holmes was appointed to the Massachusetts Supreme Court on December 15, 1882.
NovicK, supra note 63, at 169. Holmes' reluctance to dissent is expressed in the first para-
graph of his opinion, where he says: "I have the misfortune to differ from my brethren. I
have submitted my views to them at length, and, considering the importance of the question,
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cance to those who see the nexus between lawyering and limiting power is
that Holmes felt constrained to uphold the statute because he saw it as an
attempt to limit an abuse of power. He wrote:
I suppose that this act was passed because the operatives, or some
of them, thought they were often cheated out of a part of their
wages under a false pretence that the work done by them was
imperfect, and persuaded the Legislature that their view was
true. If their view was true, I cannot doubt that the Legislature
had the right to deprive the employers of an honest tool which they were
using for a dishonest purpose .... 67
In dissenting from the majority in Pery, Holmes saw limiting abuse of pri-
vate power to be so fundamental as to prevail over constitutional protec-
tion of property rights and constitutional prohibition against impairment
of the right to contract.
The law, as it has been seen by its most able and respected practition-
ers, serves American society by limiting power and its abuse. I am pleased
that students here at the University of Denver College of Law are learning
this view of the law. Mr. Steve Hall, selected by his classmates as one of the
student speakers at our May 1992 Commencement, spoke to this:
They say there are too many lawyers .... I offer this thought in
rebuttal: ... If the charter of this profession is to aspire to a
standard of dignity, competence, devotion to duty, and to the
value of the individual human being .... And in this day of an
ever more complicated social contract... ever more abstract def-
inition of property rights ... exploding technological develop-
ments.., imploding ideologies and governments... hazardous
waste, ozone holes, starvation, AIDS, Rodney King, Anita Hill
.... [T]hen how could there possibly be too many lawyers.68
It would appear that the legal profession, from its most revered mem-
bers to its newest, understands and accepts its obligation to create and
maintain a just distribution and use of power within this society. It may
well be that lawyers, as a profession, have day-to-day operational responsi-
bility for the American antipathy toward authority. Our charge is to make
antiauthoritarianism work within an ordered society. Anyone who believes
there are too many lawyers represents those among us who hold power
and would rather not be accountable for its exercise. And any lawyer who
fails to recognize the professional responsibility we bear toward preventing
the arbitrary exercise of power, makes the case that we are "overlawyered"
by at least one.
feel bound to make public a brief statement, notwithstanding the respect and deference I
feel for the judgment of those from whom I differ." Pery, 28 N.E. at 1127.
67. Pery, 28 N.E. at 1127 (emphasis added).
68. Mr. Steve Hall, Address at the University of Denver College of Law Commencement
(May 9, 1992) (emphasis supplied) (transcript on file with the DEN. U. L. Ra,.).
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